

OCTOBER 2023

Higher for longer: the demise of the "zombies"?

With "higher for longer" now being accepted as consensus, the reality is sinking in for many corporates and investors. While higher rates are actually benefiting some companies – for instance, those larger cap players that previously secured financing at very low rates – the reality is different for many other that are taking the brunt of elevated borrowing costs. However, the higher for longer environment is also leading to a major shift in the corporate ecosystem – after over a decade of ultralow rates, some poor-quality companies – with, perhaps, low margins, weak cash generation, or unstable balance sheets – may now struggle to survive. Indeed, many of these companies may now struggle to find adequate funding and thus be vulnerable to bankruptcy or acquisition.

While weaker companies may have still secured financing at a premium during the ultra-low-rate environment – as such a premium would've attracted investors on the hunt for yield – the situation has now changed with these investors able to secure a similar, less risky, return elsewhere. However, for investors committed to quality across their portfolio should not be overly concerned.

The zombie emergence

The term "zombie" company first become popular in Japan during its "lost decade" in the 1990s. However, despite the term being common currency for some time now, there is no consensus on the definition of such firms. Zombies have a hard time serving their debt. Crucial for the identification of a zombie is thus interest payments exceeding earnings (EBIT), but additional screening needs to distinguish growth firms – that need time to become profitable – from real zombies.



Virginie Maisonneuve Global CIO, Equity



Jörg Hofmann Director of Quant Research




In addition to questions of definition, computing the share of "zombification" is complicated by differences across sectors and geographies. However, recent research has revealed some robust observations. For instance, a recent Bank of International Settlements (BIS) paper showed that the number of zombie firms has grown significantly since the 1990s, with elevated levels around the great financial crisis and Covid pandemic, while also showing that small- and mid-sized firms are more affected.¹ Several approaches seek to explain this trend. Aside from the ultra-low-rate environment and

misguided easy government money, it is believed that some weaker banks have shown reluctance to write off poor performing loans from Zombies as doing so would eat into their own thinning capital buffer.

Our own research sheds further light on the history of zombie companies and the sectors in which they are more or less likely to proliferate. For instance, we see here that, according to certain criteria, the ratio of zombie companies has increased severalfold since the late 1990s.

Exhibit 1: Evolution over time – share of zombie firms



Source: Allianz Global Investors, as at 31 October 2023

And the following chart shows the breakdown of zombies across sectors.

Exhibit 2: Industry classification – share of zombie firms

7%

6%

5%

4%

2%

1%

0%

Corputate Cooks

First Link

First Lin

Source: Allianz Global Investors, as at 31 October 2023

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ Banjeree and Hofmann, Corporate Zombies: Anatomy and Life Cycle, BIS 2020

Here, we see the usual suspects from the basic materials and oil and gas industries are accompanied by health care companies, perhaps still waiting for their first blockbuster.

Should investors be concerned?

While zombification is clearly an issue for affected companies and their shareholders, the impact of this problem might go further. For instance, zombie companies weaken overall economic performance, locking up resources and crowding-out growth in more productive companies. Indeed, their existence lowers overall margins, making investment in their more efficient peers seem less attractive. While the scale of these "congestion" effects is actively discussed, any spike in corporate bankruptcies due to companies' inabilities to refinance will likely have a measurable impact on economic growth. On the other hand, the number of employees working with, and the total amount of credit given to, zombies is presumably

not large enough to trigger a recession in a scenario of elevated levels of corporate bankruptcies.

On a more practical level, investors should be wary of those sectors where zombification seems to be at its highest. It is here that we may find an uptick in bankruptcies in the coming years, and investors should seek to navigate these sectors – which remain highly attractive for other reasons – with the required expertise. However, as long as a commitment to quality is maintained throughout the portfolio and across investing styles, equity investors should not have too much to fear.

Indeed, the demise of the zombies should not be lamented – while entailing short-term pain, the end of low profitability and growth firms is a sign of the proper functioning of capital markets, rather than a symptom of some underlying problem.

Investing involves risk. The value of an investment and the income from it will fluctuate and investors may not get back the principal invested. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. This is a marketing communication. It is for informational purposes only. This document does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security and shall not be deemed an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security.

The views and opinions expressed herein, which are subject to change without notice, are those of the issuer or its affiliated companies at the time of publication. Certain data used are derived from various sources believed to be reliable, but the accuracy or completeness of the data is not guaranteed and no liability is assumed for any direct or consequential losses arising from their use. The duplication, publication, extraction or transmission of the contents, irrespective of the form, is not permitted.

This material has not been reviewed by any regulatory authorities. In mainland China, it is for Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors scheme pursuant to applicable rules and regulations and is for information purpose only. This document does not constitute a public offer by virtue of Act Number 26.831 of the Argentine Republic and General Resolution No. 622/2013 of the NSC. This communication's sole purpose is to inform and does not under any circumstance constitute promotion or publicity of Allianz Global Investors products and/or services in Colombia or to Colombian residents pursuant to part 4 of Decree 2555 of 2010. This communication does not in any way aim to directly or indirectly initiate the purchase of a product or the provision of a service offered by Allianz Global Investors. Via reception of this document, each resident in Colombia acknowledges and accepts to have contacted Allianz Global Investors via their own initiative and that the communication under no circumstances does not arise from any promotional or marketing activities carried out by Allianz Global Investors. Colombian residents accept that accessing any type of social network page of Allianz Global Investors is done under their own responsibility and initiative and are aware that they may access specific information on the products and services of Allianz Global Investors. This communication is strictly private and confidential and may not be reproduced, except for the case of explicit permission by Allianz Global Investors. This communication does not constitute a public offer of securities in Colombia pursuant to the public offer regulation set forth in Decree 2555 of 2010. This communication and the information provided herein should not be considered a solicitation or an offer by Allianz Global Investors or its affiliates to provide any financial products in Brazil, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. In Australia, this material is presented by Allianz Global Investors Asia Pacific Limited ("AllianzGI AP") and is intended for the use of investment consultants and other institutional /professional investors only, and is not directed to the public or individual retail investors. AllianzGI AP is not licensed to provide financial services to retail clients in Australia. AllianzGI AP is exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian Foreign Financial Service License under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to ASIC Class Order (CO 03/1103) with respect to the provision of financial services to wholesale clients only. AllianzGI AP is licensed and regulated by Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission under Hong Kong laws, which differ from Australian laws.

This document is being distributed by the following Allianz Global Investors companies: Allianz Global Investors GmbH, an investment company in Germany, authorized by the German Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin); Allianz Global Investors (Schweiz) AG; Allianz Global Investors UK Limited, authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority; in HK, by Allianz Global Investors Asia Pacific Ltd., licensed by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission; in Singapore, by Allianz Global Investors Singapore Ltd., regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore [Company Registration No. 199907169Z]; in Japan, by Allianz Global Investors Japan Co., Ltd., registered in Japan as a Financial Instruments Business Operator [Registered No. The Director of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Financial Instruments Business Operator), No. 424], Member of Japan Investment Advisers Association, the Investment Trust Association, Japan and Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association; in Taiwan, by Allianz Global Investors Taiwan Ltd., licensed by Financial Supervisory Commission in Taiwan; and in Indonesia, by PT. Allianz Global Investors Asset Management Indonesia licensed by Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK).